129 * VIETNAM & TROTSKYISTS

The Anti-Colonial Movement in Vietnam

Loren Goldner

[from New Politics, vol. 6, no. 3 (new series), whole no. 23, Summer 1997]

Loren Goldner is a writer living in Cambridge, Mass. His most recent article in New Politics, "The CIA and the Portuguese Revolution," appeared in the Winter 1997 issue.

NGO VAN IS A VIETNAMESE REVOLUTIONARY, LIVING TODAY AT AGE 84 in Paris. When his book^* appeared in France in 1995, it immediately created a sensation, and the aim of this review is to bring it, however modestly, to the attention of an American audience¹. Ngo Van's book is unique, as his life has been unique; his book is the first full account of the anti-colonial movement in Vietnam from 1920 to 1945, by someone who lived much of that period as a Trotskyist militant. With all the contemporary post-modernist hue and cry about listening to "other voices," here at last is a Vietnamese revolutionary Marxist telling his story, not to assert his irreducible difference, but rather, quite the contrary, to contribute to a reconstitution of the kind of real internationalism that was buried in he 1960s and 1970s under Stalinist hoopla and flag-waving for the National Liberation Front (NLF), helping to set the stage for subsequent disillusionment and the resigned, comfortable cynicism of the academic post-modernists who have managed, at least in U.S. academia, to constitute themselves as the authentic voice of the Third World. Ngo Van paid his dues, not in the hustle for tenure on some Ivy League campus, but against the successive waves of French, Japanese and Vietnamese Stalinist repression of those, like himself, who launched a movement for the emancipation of workers and peasants against both the colonial powers and then against the totalitarian nationalist bureaucracy of Ho Chi Minh, which eventually won out.

Ngo Van is, moreover, something of a Renaissance figure. He was born outside of Saigon in 1913, went to work in 1927, and in 1932 became involved in anti-colonial, and ultimately Trotskyist politics. He was in jail with Ta Thu Thau, the Vietnamese Trotskyist leader, but unlike Ta Thu Thau, he survived the Stalinist massacre of the Trotskyists in Vietnam in 1945. He made his way to France in 1948, and for the next 30 years earned his living there as a factory worker. During that period he moved away from Trotskyism and into the orbit of the councilist Information et Correspondance Ouvrières (ICO), in whose press he published articles on developments in Indochina through the years of the Vietnam War. He also managed, while still a factory worker, to write a study on divination, magic and politics in ancient China. In 1978, he was finally able to retire, and threw himself into 17 years of research and writing that resulted in this book. For good measure, the cover is a beautiful expressionist painting called "Saigon In Insurrection," by Ngo Van.

Readers of Ngo Van's book who lived through the peak years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the anti-war movement here and in Europe, will bitterly regret that it appears some 25 or 30 years too late to have its maximum political impact. (When I asked Ngo Van, perhaps impetuously, why he did not write it at that time, he replied that his factory job made that impossible.) The Third Worldism of the Western left of the 60s had as its idols Mao-tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, and awareness of the history of left oppositions to these Stalinists was almost specialist knowledge. In the case of Vietnam, in particular, the situation was complicated by the Western Trotskyists² themselves (above all in France and in the U.S.), who were so eager to appear as the "best builders" of the pro-NLF anti-war movement that the real story of their Vietnamese comrades was almost an embarrassment, "ancient history" of no relevance to the demands of the present.

What makes the case of Vietnam³ so interesting is that it is the one country where the Trotskyist movement, in the late 1930s, actually out-organized the Stalinists in mass politics.⁴

NGO VAN PROVIDES A LONG AND DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE 1920S FERMENT in the Vietnamese intelligentsia⁵, much of it in Paris exile, in their evolution (common to a number of Asian countries) from nationalism to communism. The Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) was founded out of this ferment in 1930. Thus the history of the anti-colonial movement in Vietnam, as in most other countries, became necessarily tied up with the vicissitudes of the Communist International (CI). The CI's debacle in China in 1927⁶ set the stage for the Comintern's so-called "Third Period" (1928-1934), "a class against class" policy portraying Social Democrats and other reformists as "the main enemy," which in the colonial world, after the previous period of excessive flirtation with bourgeois nationalism, sent the Communist parties off on aggressive adventurist policies. The Yenbay insurrection of February 1930, organized by bourgeois nationalists, allowed the ICP to throw itself into three years of these types of actions, all drowned in bloody repression, which almost led to the party's disappearance. All in all, the balance sheet was 4,000 arrests and 1,760 killed in repression. In the course of the 1931-33 period, a dissident current, influenced by the International Left Opposition, solidified around Ta Thu Thau, in opposition to Third Period putschism.

Just as the Shanghai massacre of 1927 had set the stage for the "Third Period," the catastrophe of Hitler's triumph in Germany marked its end. Following the fascist riots in France of February 1934, a new phase of Comintern collaboration with bourgeois parties against fascism, the Popular Front, was under way. In Vietnam this period was the backdrop of the unusual condominium between Stalinists and Trotskyists⁷ around the newspaper La Lutte, until in 1937 a directive from Ho Chi Minh brought the ICP militants into line against the "twin brothers of fascism," setting aside all anti-colonial agitation in the service of the Popular Front. This period saw a phase of electoral activity in which both Stalinists and Trotskyists won seats on the Saigon city council, a powerless body which nonetheless afforded them a certain public tribunal, while obliging them to tone down their politics. In 1936-37, however, the massive strike wave in France had its counterpart in Vietnam, where workers won the largest gains ever under the colonial regime. This worker explosion engendered a more radical Trotskyist current around a new paper, Le Militant. Ho Chi Minh's May 1937 directive ordering the ICP to break with La Lutte was a direct response to the radicalization of the strike wave, and in lockstep with the conciliatory orientation of the Popular Front and with the French Communist Party (PCF) in the metropolis and general Comintern policy. In 1938, after the Stalinists regrouped around their own newspaper L'Avant-Garde, the Trotskyists, riding the energy of the strike wave, won the Saigon municipal elections, and in 1939 won 80% of the vote for the Cochin China Colonial Council, the high-water mark of their influence prior to the 1945 insurrection. To my knowledge, this constitutes the only instance prior to 1945 in which the politics of "permanent revolution" oriented to worker and peasant opposition to colonialism won out, however ephemerally, against the Stalinist "stage theory" in a public arena.

THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II PUT AN END TO THIS PERIOD of legal opposition. The French colonial authorities ruthlessly repressed the ICP and the Trotskyists alike. After the fall of France, the Japanese took control of Vietnam but allowed the pro-Vichy police and military to continue to administer the colony. In December 1940, the ICP attempted another insurrection, like those of 1930-31, which was again bloodily put down. For various reasons, the ICP survived World War II more intact than the Trotskyists, who had no international resources to fall back on. (By 1945, on the other hand, Ho Chi Minh's forces were working with the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS).)

With the impending defeat of Japan, Ngo Van's story arrives at its dénouement, the Saigon insurrection of August-September 1945. (It is also at this point that his book overlaps with David Marr's,^** to be discussed momentarily). In the vacuum of power at the end of the war, the Vietnamese population thought the hour of independence had struck. In this mood, two perspectives collided: that of the Trotskyists, who attempted to apply a policy of "permanent revolution," based on the workers and poor peasants, and that of the Stalinist ICP, now reconstituted as the Viet Minh, who believed, or at least said, that independence could be won through negotiations. The concrete question, in August-September 1945, was armed resistance to the Chinese, English and French expeditions sent to restore Allied colonial authority. (It must be remembered that with Communist ministers in the provisional government in Paris, the ICP could plausibly argue that independence was negotiable, at least before the massacres in Algeria and Madagascar carried out by this same government showed the PCF's true stance on the colonial question. The ICP must also have known that there was no stipulation for Indochinese independence in the Yalta agreements.)

Although the Trotskyists had been weakened by the war, they re-emerged in the streets directly expressing a powerful popular mood for immediate independence and armed resistance to colonial restoration. The Viet Minh resistance movement, however, had seized local government in much of the country, and was maneuvering for position against all comers. On September 2, 1945 the Viet Minh declared independence, and a week later welcomed the arrival of British troops.⁸ On September 23, the Saigon population rose up, and for days had the foreign forces surrounded in the center of the city, cut off from supplies, but by October the French had fought their way out and re-established control. During this period Viet Minh hit squads were eliminating Trotskyists, their main serious left-wing rival, wherever they could find them. Months of international maneuvers followed, during which French control was re-established over Indochina. The Viet Minh strategy of negotiated independence had been a failure. Ho Chi Minh travelled to France for further negotiations, which also failed. In March, 1946, Ho had to confront a crowd in Hanoi, stunned by the re-establishment of French power, crying out "I swear, I have not sold you out!" Almost immediately thereafter, 30 years of war, first against the French, then against the U.S., began.

Ngo Van's book is above all a homage to several generations of anti-colonial fighters and revolutionaries, now forgotten, or calumnied as "traitors" in official Stalinist history, or relegated to footnotes in more academic studies. Its narrative is heightened by the (unobtrusive) autobiographical backdrop. One can only hope for a complete English translation, for there is no better book on the Vietnamese revolution up to 1945.

NGO VAN'S BOOK ALSO OFFERS A PERSPECTIVE FROM WHICH TO CONSIDER, in counterpoint, an altogether different kind of study written by the Australian professor David Marr, Vietnam 1945. While it would be quite unfair to criticize Marr for not being a Vietnamese revolutionary, it is certainly remarkable that he is able to write a 600-page book on many of the same events recounted by Ngo Van (although, of course, much more focused on the crucial year 1945, and on the international context) while making a grand total of 20-odd references to Vietnamese Trotskyism, virtually none of substance. The dust-cover photo of the author in amiable conversation with the Stalinist bureaucrat, Tran Van Giau, who organized the Viet Minh takeover of Saigon and who ordered the physical elimination of many Trotskyists, also gives pause. Marr's book will therefore be considered, in this review, primarily as it bears upon the political questions raised by Ngo Van.

Marr had previously written two quite interesting studies on the formation of a nationalist intelligentsia in Vietnam and its subsequent history up to 1945.⁹ His new book presents a mass of equally interesting material on this one decisive year and the relevant immediate background. The author has consulted sources in all relevant languages, including Vietnamese, Chinese and Japanese. He is certainly no naive fellow-traveler of the current Vietnamese regime, and says flatly that the great majority of Hanoi's official historical sources "spun angel hair" in their presentation and interpretation of these events. Probably the most original part of Marr's book is his social history of the 1945 insurrection outside Hanoi.

Marr's book begins with the Japanese "coup" of March 1945, in which Japan put an end to French police and military administration of Indochina, in effect since 1940.¹⁰ A situation of social crisis and impending collapse was created not merely by the looming defeat of Japan, but also by the massive famine during the unusually cruel winter of 1944-45, which Marr estimates killed one million Vietnamese, largely due to the breakdown of transport under Allied bombing and also to the indifference of both Japanese and French authorities.

Marr also provides interesting material on the attempts of the Japanese to present themselves to the Vietnamese as liberators of Asia from "white" colonialism, and the profound impression the state-of-the-art military technology and dynamism of an Asian power made on a long-colonized population. He devotes a long chapter to the wartime activities of the ICP and the Viet Minh, particularly in the run-up to the August-September insurrection. As social history drawing on many original sources, this account, like his subsequent account of the insurrection itself, is probably unsurpassed in breadth and depth in contemporary writing on the subject¹¹ (it is hard to imagine too many other writers having access to sources in as many languages as Marr). Yet it is precisely here that one feels the acute absence of the "partisan" viewpoint of Ngo Van, not to agree or disagree, but merely to be aware of the issues as they were posed for many actors. Marr is not, as shall be seen in a moment, writing the kind of contemporary "new social history" which relegates all politics to epiphenomena and footnotes, but one has the sense (assuming good faith) that he has simply never considered, or been confronted with, the idea that there was another current of serious dimension among the anti-colonial forces in Vietnam, and that the destruction of that force by the Viet Minh decisively shaped the whole history he is narrating. Thus, in a couple of paragraphs, he refers to the execution of Ta Thu Thau "by a local Viet Minh group,"¹² and says that "his frantic efforts to mobilize an anti-imperialist alternative to the Viet Minh in the north bore little fruit."¹³ And that, with 20-odd other passing references of no import, is all that Marr has to say about the intervention and physical elimination of a political force which in 1938-39 was defeating the ICP in elections and which in 1945 Marr's dust-cover companion Tran Van Giau was rounding up and executing by the dozens.

Marr says in his preface:

History is not all epic events: "small" people doing seemingly inconsequential things can sometimes influence the course of affairs. Even where there is no demonstrable effect, we need occasionally to remember that lives are being pursued...Without by any means endeavouring to write a history of the "underside," I have presented occasional views from below when the sources admit." (p. xxv)

However, in the case of the Trotskyists, there was a visible effect, there are sources (starting with reams of Stalinist vilification of them) and yet they somehow don't make it into Marr's book. IT WOULD BE SILLY TO SAY THAT MARR'S MASSIVE RESEARCH stands or falls on its failure to show Vietnamese Trotskyism in its true dimension, but that failure does show a lack of political judgment which should raise questions about other sections, about which I have no special competence to comment. His long chapters on the maneuvers of China, the U.S., Britain and France as they pursued their respective agendas in Vietnam in 1945 are full of rich detail; as indicated earlier, his chapter on the 1945 insurrection outside the big cities (to which most previous accounts have been limited) is probably a real advance in research. Marr thinks, moreover, that if the insurrection had occurred only in Hanoi, it could have been defeated by the Chinese or the French; undoubtedly the ability of the Viet Minh to eliminate the Trotskyists with so few negative consequences for themselves had something to do with the depth of their rural organization (the ICP had in fact always been more effective in the rural population, and the Trotskyists in the cities, prior to the war).

Yet, once again, Marr never confronts head-on the failure of the Viet Minh strategy of negotiated independence in 1945-46, and nowhere mentions the March 1946 Hanoi rally at which Ho Chi Minh had to plead with a skeptical crowd to believe that he had not betrayed them. The Vietnamese Trotskyists may well have been wrong to think that it was possible, in August-September 1945, to carry through "permanent revolution" against the combined force of the Allies, but the Vietnamese Stalinists were certainly wrong to think that they could negotiate independence with the French provisional government and its PCF ministers. That Marr never considers the rich material at his command in light of this problem is a sure sign that he has not sought out all the "demonstrable effects" of the thoughts and actions of Ngo Van 's forgotten revolutionaries.

NOTES

* Ngo Van, Vietnam 1920-1945, Revolution et contre-revolution sous la domination coloniale, Paris, L'insomniaqe, 1995, 444 pp. return

** David G. Marr, The Quest for Power, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995. return

1. A very abridged version of Ngo Van's book, lacking much of the rich historical background and detail, and never correcting the impression that the author is an orthodox Trotskyist, is available in English under the title Revolutionaries They Could Not Break: The Fight for the Fourth International in Vietnam, (London, Index Pr. 1995). The subtitle alone, quite foreign to the spirit of the French original and to Ngo Van's current political viewpoint, says everything. return
2. It should be made clear that neither the author of this review nor Ngo Van is a Trotskyist. Ngo Van was a Trotskyist prior to 1945, i.e. in a situation where international Trotskyism, still living on the energies of Trotsky himself, seemed to be virtually the sole left opposition to Stalinism, particularly in the colonial and semi-colonial worlds. Although Trotsky was wrong on a number of questions in the last phase of his life, starting with the nature of the Stalinist bureaucracy in Russia, he never sank to the level of the proto-Stalinist hurly-burly that Trotskyism became in the epoch of Mandel, Frank and Hansen. return
3. It should be pointed out that in the 1930s, the area today known as Vietnam was made up of three distinct areas: Annam, Tonkin and Cochinchina, all under French administration. This review will use the name "Vietnam" throughout. (Indochina, of course, refers to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). return
4. Trotskyists also made a serious impact in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Bolivia, and Argentina; prior to 1945, however, the case of Vietnam was unique, to my knowledge. return
5. The core of this group was the so-called "Five Dragons," Nguyen ai Quoc (later famous under the name Ho Chi Minh), Phan van Truong, Nguyen an Ninh, Nguyen the Truyen, and Phan chau Trinh. return
6. Under the leadership of Stalin and Bukharin, the CI pushed the Chinese Communist Party into a close alliance with the bourgeois nationalist Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-Shek who, in 1927, disarmed the Shanghai working class and massacred thousands of workers there. return
7. As Ngo Van put it in an interview after the publication of his book, "Indochina under the French was a prison, and there was nothing to do but unite against the jailer." It has also been suggested that the influence of the independent Marxist, Nguyen an Ninh, one of the "Five Dragons," made possible this unusual collaboration, as both the Stalinist and Trotskyist intellectuals had been deeply influenced by him. return
8. One criticism that can be made of Ngo Van's book is the absence of discussion of the confusion of some of the Trotskyists about the Stalinist repression against them, possibly having its roots in the 1933-37 period of collaboration on La Lutte. Here was a case where theoretical disarmament preceded literal disarmament. The backdrop of this confusion was the Trotskyists' belief that the Stalinists were "Mensheviks," to which they were the Bolsheviks. On September 12, 1945, for example (an incident not related by Ngo Van) the Viet Minh police in Saigon surrounded the headquarters of the pro-Trotskyist People's Councils. The Trotskyists surrendered without a fight. "We conducted ourselves as true revolutionary militants. We let ourselves be arrested without using violence against the police, even though we were more numerous and well-armed. They sacked our office, breaking furniture, ripping our flags, stealing the typewriters and burning all our papers." (quoted in R.J. Alexander, International Trotskyism, Durham 1991, p. 970). return
9. These are Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925 (1971) and Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (1981). return
10. Japan's aim in 1940 was mainly to close off the border with China to prevent supplies from reaching Chiang Kai-Shek's armies, without having to shoulder the full costs of an occupation. The French thereby continued to administer Indochina much as the Vichy regime administered the "free zone" of France after June 1940. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the tables were turned and the Japanese army was used by the Allies to police parts of Indochina. return
11. I must point out, for clarification, that I am no specialist in Southeast Asia and know its history only from standard accounts available in English and French, and from the debates in the 1960s anti-war movement mentioned earlier. I was similarly motivated to write this review not for scholars but in the light of the political questions, of international interest, raised by Ngo Van's book. return
12. There are conflicting versions of the death of Trotskyist leader Ta Thu Thau. Ngo Van only says (p. 344) that he had probably been killed by a local people's committee by September 9; Marr has him (pp. 434-435) arrested and executed in Quang Ngai after a "perfunctory trial"; Alexander has him tried and acquitted three times by people's committee's and finally "executed on orders from the southern Stalinist leader Tran Van Giau" (op. cit. p. 971), (the latter being the same figure appearing on the dust cover of Marr's book in conversation with the author). Better known and documented are the comments of Ho Chi Minh on Ta Thu Thau's death during his trip to Paris for negotiations at the end of 1945. Asked about it by French Trotskyist Rodolphe Prager, Ho "replied that Ta Thu Thau and the other Trotskyist leaders were really revolutionaries and that it was a great shame that they had been killed, but that it was done by local Viet Minh officials under conditions in which it was impossible for those in Hanoi to control what all the local leaders were doing." (ibid.) Later during the same trip, however, Ho was asked the same question by Daniel Guerin. Guerin recorded Ho's reply: "Thau was a great patriot and we mourn him," Ho Chi Minh told me with unfeigned emotion. But a moment later he added in a steady voice: "All those who do not follow the line which I have laid down will be broken." (ibid.) return
13. Marr, p. 137. Marr's 90-page chapter on the ICP and the Viet Minh, while naturally focused on the war and above all 1945, makes no mention of the complicated history of relations between Stalinists and Trotskyists in Vietnam before 1939, nor any mention of Trotskyist dominance in the 1938 and 1939 elections. Throughout, the Trotskyists are merely mentioned as another current. return

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The Media and the Voices of Protest during the Vietnam War

Kelly Klaich

This unit will begin with a basic understanding of the beginnings of the Cold War and the threat of the spread of communism that arose following World War II. Though the war had ended in Europe in May 1945, there was still the war in the Pacific. It was a very deadly war where American troops fought for each island on their way to the Japanese mainland and eventual victory. Fresh from a victory in Europe, the Allied troops with President Truman now at the helm wanted to end the war with all possible haste. The Americans had developed the Atomic bomb and chose to use it against the Japanese in order to gain immediate victory and minimal loss of American life. The choices of whether or not the atomic bomb was necessary will be a part of a previous unit. I bring it up at the beginning of this unit however because it is crucial to the start of the Cold War and understanding why the Cold War stayed cold for as long as it did. It must be addressed in some form before beginning this unit. 

Historians seem to assign every generation a great theme. The baby boomers or Cold War babies who were born between 1946-1964 grew up with the threat of nuclear destruction hanging over their heads. Because of the way that World War II ended in Japan, the world recognized that nuclear weapons could annihilate human kind as it was known. Although the United States cautiously guarded the secrets of the atom bomb, the Soviet Union quickly obtained secrets that speeded up their nuclear weapons program and successfully tested a bomb by 1949. The two allies who had fought together in a hot war, World War II or as the Soviets called it the Great Patriotic War of their generation, were now engaged in a war of nerves. Both sides had the power to destroy the other at the push of a button. What remained to be seen was whether or not the United States or the Soviet Union would start the fighting. 

When Nikita Khrushchev came to power in 1955, the situation intensified. Communism divided Europe and controlled Eastern Europe. Although Khrushchev claimed to be a reformer, he brutally crushed the Hungarians when they tried to break away from communism. Khrushchev was also viewed by the West as being very imperialistic. In 1961 the United States also had a new leader. John F. Kennedy, a Democrat, would continue the fight for democracy. Early on in his presidency, Kennedy suffered three enormous setbacks in the Cold War. America was defeated in its attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs. Khrushchev verbally denounced Kennedy at a conference in Vienna where they met for the first time. Then, the Soviets began to build a wall around West Berlin. These were three apparent communist victories. Soon after in 1962, Khrushchev exported his militarism into the Western Hemisphere in the form of missiles to Cuba. America’s worst fear was realized when only ninety miles from the coast of Florida, the Soviet Union delivered missiles to Cuba. Surveillance photographs showed that the missiles were being secured and it was only a matter of time until they could be ready for use against the United States. In a very tense thirteen days, Kennedy and Krushchev became involved in a standoff. Kennedy won because of the preponderant American nuclear superiority in terms of bombers and missiles. The Soviet missiles were removed and sent back to the Soviet Union. In return, the United States quietly agreed to dismantle missiles in Turkey. The crisis brought Kennedy a much-needed victory but was a humiliation for Krushchev.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the height of the Cold War. The removal of the missiles from Cuba was the beginning of the end of the Cold War. Never again would the United States and the Soviet Union confront each other directly. However, it was the commencement of indirect confrontations in which these two nations used third world nations in Asia to prove their military superiority. The Cuban Missile Crisis served to increase American suspicions of communism, which controlled over two-thirds of Asia. The two largest Asian nations, China and the Soviet Union, lived under communist regimes. Together these two countries spanned an area that started from the Arctic Ocean, continued across the entire continent to the Pacific Ocean and over half way down Asia. Only the fringe of Asia seemed to remain free of communist control. This was the subcontinent of India and the countries of the Southeast Asian peninsula. Americans feared that if any of those countries fell, the islands of the Pacific would fall to communism. American foreign policy began to reflect the belief that the democratic nations could not afford to let any more countries fall to communism. South Vietnam was viewed as the key to the rest of Southeast Asia. If South Vietnam fell to communism, it was feared that according to the domino theory, the remainder of Asian countries would fall like a bunch of dominos that have been neatly lined up in a row. There seemed to some to be no other choice than to implement a containment policy in Asia similar to the one Truman had followed in Europe with the Truman Doctrine in Greece and in prosecution of the Korean War.

Containment most likely had it roots in the lessons learned from World War II and Hitler. Europe tried to appease Hitler by giving him first Austria and then Czechoslovakia. Hitler was not satisfied and soon went after Poland and all of Europe. The same could be said concerning the lessons learned from Stalin. He had promised democratic elections in Eastern Europe after the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam, but it soon became obvious that none of these elections would take place and that the Soviet Union would spread communism wherever they expanded their borders. The United States wanted to make sure that such a thing did not happen again, and so it would not appease communism by giving up any country as long as they could help it. The diplomat George Kennan, an ambassador to the Soviet Union, laid out the foundation for such a containment policy in his “Mr. X” article that happened in Foreign Affairs Quarterly in 1974. 

Vietnam was formerly known as French Indochina. The Vietnamese portion of the sub peninsula had been the scene of colonization and internal strife long before the United States became involved. Vietnam’s independence was threatened many times in its national history by larger nations such as China, but the French were the ultimate colonial rulers. By 1885, the French controlled what is known today as Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The French had divided Vietnam into thirds in an attempt to undermine any unity upon the part of the Vietnamese. In the northern region the French built factories while the south relied completely on agriculture. During French rule, the exports remained high regardless of whether or not the people had enough food to eat. While the Vietnamese chafed under French domination, independence movements were not greatly organized. At the turn of the century the younger generation of upper-middle class Vietnamese began to be educated in France with the hopes that such an education could help their country in future. One such man would become known as Ho Chi Minh. He initially applied to the Colonial Trade School in Paris so that he could be useful to France in helping his people. When he was denied, he changed his name to Nguyen ai Quoc, Nguyen the Patriot, and began to stir up resistance. He tried to gain entrance to the Versailles conference in 1919 to speak about Vietnamese independence but was dismissed. He did create enough of a scene, however, with his antics, that word of him reached the people of Vietnam. In 1920, Nguyen joined the French Communist Party, becoming the first Vietnamese communist and changed his name to Ho Chi Minh. By 1923, he had gained the notice of the Soviets and went to Moscow for training. Although he is to become a national Vietnamese hero, he spent the next years of his life traveling through Germany, France, Thailand, Russia and China as a communist organizer.

The French had suffered many defeats during World War II. By June of 1940 not only had France been invaded by Germany, but it had also begun to lose control of Indochina at the hands of the Japanese. The Japanese initially left control of Indochina to the French and only used Vietnamese airbases for their military operations in the Pacific, but it did not take long for the Vietnamese to realize that the Japanese were actually in control. The Vietnamese were greatly impressed by the Japanese victory over the French and the British in Malaya because for the first time, Asians had actually overthrown European powers.

As World War II began to draw to a close and it became obvious that the Allied powers would win, the decision of what was to be done with the area that the Axis countries had conquered was very difficult. Roosevelt was a strong advocate for self-determination. He felt that the era of colonialism was drawing to a close and these colonies needed to choose for themselves whether they wanted to be independent or not. Churchill was wary of supporting self-determination in French Indochina, because if France was stripped of its colonies, it would only be a matter of time before Great Britain lost hers as well. The French president in exile, Charles de Gaulle, remained adamant in his position on Indochina. He believed that France still owned Indochina and when the war was over, they would return with arms in hand to reclaim what Japan had taken whatever the cost. 

At about the same time, Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam to organize and rally the people for an independence movement. When the people found out that Ho Chi Minh was actually Nguyen ai Quoc, they flocked to his cause and the Viet Minh was established. The Viet Minh seized rice fields and fed the starving population and in return gained popular support for their cause that they would never lose. Unfortunately for the Viet Minh, the war ended before the United States and other allied powers could fully understand them and their goals for Vietnam. As the mistrust of communism began to rise, what the allies did not perceive was that Ho Chi Minh was a nationalist before he was a communist. He wanted independence for his country first and foremost. In 1945 Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh marched into Hanoi peacefully and declared their nation’s independence using the style and rhetoric of the American and French declarations centuries ago. They had gained their independence from the Japanese and declared they would fight any attempt made by the French to regain the territory they handed over to the Japanese five years earlier. In his speeches and actions, he did not threaten those with differing opinions. He peacefully united nationalist organizations in the north.

Again, it was unfortunate for the Viet Minh that the United States and Great Britain wanted a strong recovered France to take its place in the international arena. If they needed to sacrifice Indochina to accomplish that goal, they were willing to do so. During the peace settlements directly following the war, Vietnam was temporarily divided at the sixteenth parallel so that China could disarm the Japanese in the North and Great Britain could do the same in the South. The Chinese and British betrayed the Viet Minh by disarming them and leaving them at the mercy of the French and Japanese. In dealings with the French, Ho Chi Minh was led to believe that if he allowed French occupation until the Chinese were gone, France would acknowledge Vietnamese independence. Ho Chi Minh traveled to France to work out the terms of independence. However, because of the instability in the French government, it quickly became obvious to Ho Chi Minh that the French were not serious about granting Vietnam independence. 

What followed from 1946-1954 was a massive war for independence in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam to lead his people against the French. France, aided by American dollars and weapons, was determined to fight at all costs. The Viet Minh were initially only equipped with bamboo spears and captured weapons until 1950 when Ho Chi Minh’s government was officially recognized by China and then the Soviet Union. Soon after this recognition Ho Chi Minh began to receive military aid from the Soviet Union and China that included among other items new anti-aircraft guns guided by radar. It was a war in which the French controlled the cities and won the daytime fighting and the Vietnamese had the popular support of the countryside and was victorious during night time maneuvers. The end came in the valley of Dien Bien Phu. The Vietnamese outnumbered the French four to one. They were dedicated to victory and slowly encircled the French and cut off all of their supplies with methodically dug trenches. In addition, their anti-aircraft guns were instrumental in shooting down French planes trying to re-supply its army. On May 7, 1954, the French surrendered.

The conflict was to be settled at the Geneva Convention. The problems and direct American involvement were just beginning. Two decisions were made in Geneva. The first one was that Vietnam would be temporarily separated to recover from the war. The second decision was that it would be reunified in national elections in two years. Whatever government could gain the support of the majority of the country would be in control. What terrified the United States, however, was the enormous popularity of Ho Chi Minh since he was seen as a communist puppet of the Soviet Union. 

South Vietnam was hypothetically democratic while the North was seen as a client state of communist China and the Soviet Union and a direct threat to the survival of the democracy of the South. As a result the United States sent in advisors to help the democratic government led by Ngo Dinh Diem. These advisors were supposed to help Diem gain popularity during the next two years so that a united Vietnam would be democratic. The advisors were very limited and were not involved directly in the fighting that would result between the north and south when the expected national elections and reunification of 1956 did not occur.

The advisory position of the United States continued for many years. While Diem gladly accepted American support and financial help in his civil war, he did not pay much attention to American advice. President John Kennedy sent Green Berets to Vietnam to help train the South Vietnamese army. After the assassination of Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson came to the presidency. He increased American forces in the country and the role of American troops was changed from advisors to waging military operations after the controversial events in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964 in which the USS Maddox may or may not have been attacked by the North Vietnamese. Initially the war was supported because it was in American national interest to stop the spread of communism. Because it was an election year, Johnson initially hesitated on the issue of Vietnam, but, after his victory, he began to pour troops into Vietnam. 

Unfortunately for Johnson, the Vietnam War became a media phenomenon. Up until this time, wars had never been visually reported live via television as the battles were being fought. Previously people were apprised of what was going on, but the pictures they saw were newsreels that had been sanitized for the viewers and approved by the military. With the widespread use of the television, the war came into the living rooms of America on a nightly basis. News stations showed massacres and planes unloading coffins and body bags. For most Americans it was the first real taste of war brought home and shoved in their faces. Men died in battles, everyone knew that, but when heroes or villains died in the movies, there was an almost bloodless gunshot and he magically was buried without the need for the body bag or coffin. The media attention led to a changing atmosphere and by the late 1960s there were radical peace and anti-war demonstrations. Additionally, there were pictures and reports of Buddhist monks burning themselves in the streets in protest and children who had fallen victim to napalm bombs running naked down the street. Johnson’s popularity evaporated almost overnight. He chose not to run for re-election and the new Democratic candidates were running on anti-war platforms. The instability of the country is epitomized by the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. While the candidates were speaking about platforms of peace safely inside, violent riots were taking place in the city streets. Jerry Rubin of the Youth International Party told an interviewer that it was impossible to hold the convention without protest anywhere because the Democratic party was to blame for the war and had blood on its hands. He outspokenly said that there was “a struggle going on today between young people and the old menopausal men that [were] running the country.” The generational battle lines of public opinion were clearly drawn by that statement.

With the Democratic Party bitterly split over the war issue, the Republican candidate Richard Nixon won the presidency. He intensified the bombing of North Vietnam in the hope that the South Vietnamese could hold the line against the North. At the same time, he began to pull the troops out of Vietnam. Most troops were withdrawn from Vietnam by the beginning of 1973, and by April 1975 the North overran South Vietnam. Contrary to many predictions, the domino effect that the United States had feared enough to commit five hundred thousand men to fight never occurred.

I would like to emphasize the causes of the war as well as the deep scars that were left on the generation involved in the war and upon the American national consciousness. There were two very different generations at this time. There was the older generation who had fought in World War II because it was their patriotic duty. The United States had been attacked and everyone knew why the United States was fighting the war. Then there was this younger generation that was beginning to exercise their first amendment rights. With the changing role of the media and quicker access to information from the battlefront, the reasons for war and death were not as obvious and they were being questioned like never before. This lack of concrete reason sparked and fueled the protests. The generation that had served could not understand this new generation that was refusing to fight for their country. 

As the nightly news updated the American people on the overall body count to date, many young people began to voice their discontent with what was going on halfway across the world. The anti-war music that was written during the time is typified by “Fortunate Son” by Credence Clearwater Revival, “I-Feel-Like-I’m-Fixin’-to-Die Rag” by Country Joe McDonald, Bob Dylan’s “Blowin’ in the Wind,” and the Kingston Trio’s “Where Have all the Flowers Gone?” There were few songs, mostly country music, that actually supported the war. The best known was “The Ballad of the Green Berets” by SSgt Barry Sadler.

Other examples of protest came in the form of art propaganda used by the anti-war movement to vilify and denigrate the entire war effort and war policy. One such picture shows bodies of women and children on the road with the following written above it, “Q: And Babies? A. And Babies.” Another poster asked, “Would you burn a child? When necessary.” Yet another of a young man who is burning his draft card. And another of an unidentified hand shoving the Statue of Liberty down an Asian’s throat. And yet another showed Hitler with a Nixon Mask. The entire country was seeing everything that was wrong with the war real, imagined, or sensationalized. 

Many of these protestors that were against the war claimed that their anti-war protests were geared towards returning their brothers home from certain death and ending the war that was killing them in greater and greater numbers. Others became critical of the anti-war protests saying that their demonstrations took away support for the cause that these men were willing to die.

The media created a new sense of reality for America. Today, distanced from the raw emotions that were evoked by the deaths and havoc endured by Americans in Vietnam, we can look at the war more objectively and better determine fact from sensationalism. During the war, riots and protests broke out because the people were so troubled by the realities of the war as reported by the media. Television media was especially disturbing and prompted a reaction among those who started to openly question and distrust the policies of their government. There were many that believed that the Vietnam War was a poor man’s and black man’s fight because attending college made many men exempt from the draft and deferments could be purchased. According to Lt. General McCaffrey Vietnam Veterans were very well educated and the majority of them had a high school education or better. Not all men attended college to avoid being drafted. Many enlisted after obtaining their education and saw Vietnam as a chance to advance their careers in the military. According to General Westmoreland—whose actions were later revealed not to be the most credible—two-thirds of the men who served in Vietnam were volunteers. Vietnam created a brotherhood among the men that served, because they relied on each other for protection and support. Many men served two and three tours of duty to return and fight next to these friends. Another myth was that a disproportionate number of blacks were killed in the Vietnam War when according to Westmoreland and the Combat Area Casualty File, over three-fourths of the men who died in Vietnam were Caucasians.

Another void that the news helped to create and could not fill was the reason the United States was involved in the war at all. During World War II the undeniable enemy was Hitler’s Germany and the Empire of Japan—the ultimate threat to democracy. Fighting this war preserved the way of life as we know it. It was the Good War. During the Vietnam War, however, there were no tangible reasons for conducting it other than the abstract threat of communist expansion in a remote part of the world many miles from home. The government could talk about containment and the threat of communism, but there were many people that did not think that what happened in Vietnam threatened their own democracy. Therefore, if their democracy was not threatened, why were their sons and husbands dying in far off lands. This was a question that could not be answered and so many war protestors used it as their platform. Another issue that continued to present itself was the instability of the Saigon government. Ngo Dinh Diem was killed in a coup in 1963. Although the United States was fighting to preserve a democratic government in South Vietnam, it was not lost on the newscasters or the American people that the position of Premier of South Vietnam had an extremely high turnover rate. If the war was won, what type of government would be left in control?

Probably the worst and most publicized protest turned violent occurred at Kent State University in reaction to the war being extended into Cambodia. Kent was the perfect example of youthful college students who were wanting to exercise their first amendment rights. They did not want to just have opinions on what was going on in Vietnam, they wanted to do something about it. Unfortunately, many of them were antagonistic with their righteous indignation. Starting on May 1st, there were riots in downtown Kent in which windows of businesses that could potentially support the war were targeted with bricks or rocks. The students got carried away in the heat of the moment and the end result was the entrance of the Ohio National Guard. The mayor of Kent and the president of the University were afraid they would not be able to control what was happening on campus and downtown with their limited forces. The National Guard was brought in to keep the peace but unfortunately added more fuel to the fire. To the zealous students, the National Guard was a symbol of not only the war they were protesting but also martial law. In the days leading up to May 4th, they did not want to curb any of their emotions, speech, or actions because of the appearance of military personnel. In defiance, they burned the ROTC building on campus and then ignored the mandatory curfew either in defiance or ignorance that a curfew existed. 

On May 4th, the situation spun out of control. Neither side could have predicted that their actions would have such a horrible effect. In their defiance, the protestors threatened the National Guard, and the National Guard did not know how far they were or were not to go. Their attempts to contain the students and restore order were seen as antagonistic. Most likely by accident, a shot was fired that escalated into sixty-seven shots fired in thirteen seconds that left four students dead and many more wounded. The country was torn apart. The students were left shocked that they had been fired on since they were obviously unarmed. The National Guard was an immediate villain that did not understand how the situation had escalated so quickly. The public as well was split. There were many, parents of students included, interviewed by news crews who felt that the students got what they deserved; that they had been warned and chosen to ignore those warnings. Then there were others who felt that the killings at Kent State were an extension of everything else that was wrong with the Vietnam War. This was Vietnam America with civilian blood flowing in America as well as in Vietnam.

Following the war, America entered a time of self-imposed denial. It had seen the war on the news for an entire decade. No one wanted to go to the movies to see the Vietnam War, and so it was largely ignored. During the War, The Green Berets was one of the only movies that appeared about the war, and it was made mostly to whip up support for the war at home. Then after the war, Coming Home and Deerhunter attempted to address the issue but they did not touch on the war at all, simply the after effects. America was not ready to see the real war. It was not until Apocalypse Now and Platoon debuted that actual fighting was portrayed and the human aspect of what soldiers endured was dealt with by movies.

Understanding of the Cold War and the Vietnam War is essential to understand an entire generation. Many of my students have relatives that fought in Vietnam and yet they know nothing about it. Because of the negative publicity and anti-war sentiment that was felt during the Vietnam war, many of the veterans returned home from fighting into a state of limbo. Because of the unpopularity of the war, not all received a heroes welcome. It was even over emphasized by some who perhaps had something to gain politically or otherwise that some veterans were even scorned. As new generations grow up, much is lost, but there is also a lot to be gained. As can be seen by recent movies being made about Vietnam, time is the great healer. Perhaps it is because there have been other televised conflicts since the Vietnam War, but the newer generation has the potential to be more accepting of the Vietnam War than their parents were. Much of this acceptance also has to do with the shift in politics as well as the fact that a just war has now seemed to emerge in the war against terrorism since the events of September 11, 2001. Additionally, teenagers today do not have the intensely personal link to the struggle that their parents did. After the Vietnam War, the conservative right eventually won and is perhaps still winning the battle in Hollywood. There was a belief that the war had been “winnable” and that the media betrayed the soldiers and cut the war movement off at the knees. Today there is a much more reflective aspect to Hollywood in which they are willing to make movies in which all aspects of the war are called into question such as the leadership of the war effort and not just the protest movements at home. 

The Vietnam War and the public protest that erupted because of it was a turning point in American history. It proved that Americans would no longer accept half of the truths/answers in regards to what the United States was doing militarily. The widespread access to media changed everything. The government was no longer in control of the information that the people received. The news could and would be broadcast to the people without the censorship of the government newsreels. Since the people could see with their own eyes what was happening as it occurred, military operations could not be covered up with the appropriate spin. 

Often wars have a way of being romanticized. It is not until fighting age men are directly confronted with the brutal reality of war, such as in World War I and World War II, that these fanciful illusions are dispelled. Vietnam ended idyllic views of war for one generation among many though not all in the population of an entire country. Vietnam became about protest. It is also about young men who went off to serve their country and the families that permitted them to go. Vietnam was also about America finding its voice to speak out—many in protest. It was about questioning authority when authorities could not offer adequate answers. Teenagers today need to understand the multifaceted layers of this war as a helpful at to understand what is going on in the world today. Vietnam has been in the news often over the past few years as an example of what the United States must be careful to avoid. When talking about the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Israel and Palestine, not wanting another Vietnam is always mentioned by one newscaster or another. Today’s teenagers need to know what is meant by such statements so that they can have an educated opinion on what is happening in their world and choices they may be called upon to make. Also there is the lesson that events in one place and time are not necessarily applicable in another.

I plan on teaching this unit with many primary documents. I have found many books of war protest posters. There are also many songs that can be used to have students listen and determine what issues are being talked about. There are also many pictures of battle scenes as well as still photos that were taken on site that bring home the reality of what people where seeing thirty years ago as well as news clips that were aired by major news stations. The one problem that I need to make sure to address correctly is that these teenagers have grown up seeing the realities of war on the news. I think that it will be difficult for them to understand the shock that many people felt at seeing it for the first time since we are currently embroiled in a war on terrorism that is nightly on the news and is also enjoying widespread support. It is essential to find a way to bring the shock home to them to make the protest movement all the more real and legitimate. I intend to show a video about Kent State that has live interviews of all sides that were involved. I also intend on showing clips from Hollywood movies that have begun to tackle the issue of what exactly happened during the war. As we tackle these issues we will also discuss how these movies are products of a commercial venture. They were made with a purpose, and students should be able to discuss what point of view or what issues the movies are trying to support. Keeping in mind that movies change according to what is happening at the time they were made.

OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF LESSONS

Since all of the lessons will be utilizing a variety of primary documents, throughout all of the lessons, the objectives will be stated together.

Students will be able to synthesize information presented in images, documents, and music from the times.

Students will be able to identify patters of protest throughout the Vietnam War period.

Students will be able to draw conclusions about lifestyles, images, and social status during the Vietnam period.

Students will be able to identify protest leaders, issues, and implications of the expanding protest movement.

Students will be able to breakdown what they have learned from the primary documents and re-teach it to their fellow classmates.

Students will be able to form an opinion about the protest movement and the influence of the media on the Vietnam War.

RELATED LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES

Geography, History, Political Science

GRADE LEVEL

11th grade U.S. History

LESSON #1: The birth of the protest

TIME ALLOTMENT: 2 Class Periods (54 minutes each)

The American public initially supported the Vietnam War. The public did not question Eisenhower and Kennedy when they sent military advisors into South Vietnam. Much of the protest did not begin until 1963 when a Buddhist monk calmly sat in the lotus position had a fellow monk poured gasoline over his body and calmly lit a match. The picture of his immolating body made instant headlines and jolted the American public into questioning exactly what was happening in Saigon. This image began to be followed by others such as a naked girl burnt by a napalm bomb running through the streets, American body bags as they arrived back in the United States, and savage pictures of the war front. This lesson focuses on events occurring during the time period between 1963-1968.

MATERIALS

Photographs from the war front or the news. These can be found in various places—the internet, old newspapers and magazines from the time, and textbooks from the library if you have access to ELMO or other projectors that can show a picture on the screen to the class without violating copyright.

New clips that can be found in many documentary films of the Vietnam War that many libraries—school or university—own. A good recommendation is Vietnam: A Television History. 1983. Videocassette. WGBH Boston and The American Experience.

FOCUS 

A focus to this lesson deals with two questions. They are (1) how did visual photographs increase anti-war protest? (2) How do they feel about the visual representation of the war and how might it have caused them to act?

ACTIVITIES

After a short discussion on the escalation of the war, students will be divided into groups and given copies specific inflammatory pictures. Their purpose in examining these pictures is to ask themselves the following questions:

1. Who or what situation is being shown in the picture/news clip?

2. What was the purpose in the photographers forever making a memory out of this event?

3. Is there a victim in this picture and if so who and why do you think so?

4. What do you think the reaction of the American people was to this photograph/news clipping?

5. What is your reaction to the photograph/news clip?

LESSON #2: The Protest movement breaks into song

TIME ALLOTMENT: 1 day (54 minutes)

1965 is a pivotal year in the war and the music begins to reflect the doubt the American People are feeling with such songs as

“Fortunate Son” by Creedence Clearwater Revival

“I-Feel-Like-I’m-Fixin’-to-Die Rag” by Country Joe McDonald

“Blowin’ in the Wind” by Bob Dylan

“Where Have all the Flowers Gone?” by the Kingston Trio

“Lyndon Johnson Told the Nation” by Tom Paxton

“Soldier’s Last Letter” by Merle Haggart

There were few songs, mostly country music that actually supported the war. The best known was “The Ballad of the Green Berets” by SSgt Barry Sadler.

FOCUS

The focus to this lesson deals with two questions. (1) What issues did singers and songwriters confront with their music? (2) How effectively did song incorporate protest?

MATERIALS

Music—it can be found in compilations of Protest Songs, individually by artist, or in other 1960s or 1970scollections

Lyrics—I have duplicates of the musical lyrics granted by permission from Choices from the 21st Century Education Project—a project of Brown University.

ACTIVITIES

There will be a quick reminder of the escalating emotions that was discussed in the previous lesson. We will then begin to dissect the songs of protest as well as the most common song of support. This lesson will start as an individual activity. Each student will receive copies of the chosen song lyrics. We will listen to the songs one at a time after they read the lyrics once. It is their task to try to find issues/themes within the lyrics that the country would have been protesting. After they have reached personal opinions, they will be divided into groups where they will dig a little deeper into the lyrics. 

1. Can they find connections from emotions created by the pictures from the previous lesson to the song lyrics?

2. Which segments of the public would have been most likely attracted to certain songs?

3. Did the meaning of the lyrics change due to the tone/mood of the singer?

4. Is the song angry, sad, hopeful, sarcastic, joyful, and triumphant…?

5. What attitude toward the war is being expressed?

6. Whose opinion are the songwriters expressing: their own or societies?

LESSON #3: Analyzing Political Cartoons and Propaganda Posters

TIME ALLOTMENT: 1 Class Period (54 minutes)

MATERIALS

Political cartoons—hopefully in the index

Martin, Susan, ed. Decade of Protest: Political Posters from the United States, Vietnam, and Cuba 1965-1975. New York: Smart Art Press, 1996. If you can use an overhead projector to show these posters to students or receive permission to reprint them, they are outstanding propaganda posters.

FOCUS

The focus of this lesson would be to determine what type of audience such propaganda and comics were meant to reach. Also to be determined is how such printed materials could change the American opinion towards the war perhaps through exaggeration.

ACTIVITIES

In our continuing look at the protest movement, we will see how protest moved from song into printed posters. In looking at the pictures in groups, students will try to determine

1. Can they find connections from emotions created by the pictures and song lyrics from the previous lesson?

2. What members of the American public are these posters/comics targeting?

3. Are these posters meant to offend people? If so, why?

4. What attitude toward the war is being expressed?

5. What previous work of art, if any, is being changed for the purpose of protest? What themes are the artists building off?

6. Who is the victim?

7. Who is the perpetrator?

8. Are these pictures/representations factual?

9. Additional possible questions can be found for specific cartoons in the back.

Lesson #4: Lessons from Protest—Is there a limit to safe use of the First Amendment?

As the war escalated, the mood of the country became more and more volatile. This can be seen specifically in the events that occurred during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago as well as the riots at Kent State University in 1970.

TIME ALLOTMENT: 2 Class Periods (possibly 2 ½)(54 minutes each)

MATERIALS

Kent State: The Day the War Came Home. By Iain Mclean. Narr. David Mucci. Exec. Prod. Mark Mori. Ed. Trevor Aikman. 2000. Videocassette. Landmark Media Inc.

Vietnam: A Television History. 1983. Videocassette. WGBH Boston and The American Experience. Volume 6: The Homefront.

Textbook or other access to the First Amendment

FOCUS

The focus of this lesson will be to determine how the First Amendment allowed for unstable situations to escalate into violence. We will try to come to a conclusion about the usage of the First Amendment and whether it can lead to riots that could or should have been avoided/prevented.

ACTIVITIES

Although it will be chronologically out of order, I will show the video on the events at Kent State first since it will take the entire period. The following day, I will show a short clip from the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. During these video clips, students will be asked to list possible answers to the following questions:

1. Describe the specific divisive attitudes of the people.

2. What were some of the reasons that violence erupted?

3. Could violence have been avoided?

4. What groups/ people should take responsibility for the escalation of violence?

5. Is there a way that violence/riots could have been avoided?

6. In what way did the riots escalate? Did it happen slowly or immediately

After watching the videos, students will be asked to consult with fellow students to elaborate on their answers so that they can defend them to the class if necessary.

Once students have had a chance to form their own opinion, we will look back to the First Amendment. Many of these situations began because of the right to the freedom of speech, press, and assembly. We will discuss whether or not they think the right was abused and determine if there should be limits on rights of free speech in order to prevent such occurrences in the future.

Bibliography

Anderegg, Michael A., ed. Inventing Vietnam: The War in Film and Television. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991

Part of my unit will rely on the aspect of media during the war and how it was the first televised war and how that effected the war effort at home. I think this source will give me a good insight into the roll of media as well as Hollywood. 

Andrews, Owen, C. Douglass Elliott, and Laurence L. Levin. Vietnam: Images from Combat Photographers. Washington, D.C.: Starwood Publishing Inc., 1991.

This is an absolutely stunning book of pictures taken from combat. It has American and both North and South Vietnamese soldiers. Also in this book is the amazing physical toll that was taken on the land and civilian population.

Beckett, Brian. The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War. New York City: Gallery Books, 1985.

This is also an amazing book of pictures taken from combat. It has American and both North and South Vietnamese soldiers. Also in this book is the amazing physical toll that was taken on the land and civilian population. Additionally, it has great written history that corresponds to the pictures and the events of the war. 

Faas, Horst, and Tim Page, eds. Requiem. New York: Random House, 1997.

This book also details the war in pictures. Many of the photos compiled in this book won Pulitzer prizes such as the mother fleeing American bombs across a river with her four children. It has photos from LIFE covers. It also so the emotional impact on American soldiers. Other pictures include some of the horrifying torture that the Vietnamese inflicted on each other. All such pictures are ones that came home to the American public and increased the anti-war sentiment in the United States.

Hallin, Daniel C. Hallin. The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Part of my unit will rely on the aspect of media during the war and how it was the first televised war and how that effected the war effort at home.

Hammond, William M. Reporting Vietnam Media and Military at War. Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1998.

This provided good insight into the Media’s changing role in Vietnam.

Kent State: The Day the War Came Home. By Iain Mclean. Narr. David Mucci. Exec. Prod. Mark Mori. Ed. Trevor Aikman. 2000. Videocassette. Landmark Media Inc.

This is a great video that chronicles the discontent at Kent State University from May 1-4, 1970. It has interviews with both student activists as well as National Guard members. I am going to show this in class as we get to the end of the war and use it to have a discussion about the First Amendment and when or if it is ever a threat to American safety.

Lanning, Michael Lee. Vietnam at the Movies. New York: Ballantine Books, 1994.

This book breaks down all the movies and series that were created around the Vietnam War. It breaks down their points of view and the times in which they were made.

Martin, Susan, ed. Decade of Protest: Political Posters from the United States, Vietnam, and Cuba 1965-1975. New York: Smart Art Press, 1996.

This book is full of political posters that show the extent of the division in the country. It also includes propaganda used in Vietnam. 

McCaffrey, Lt. Gen. Barry R. Address. Vietnam Veterans and other visitors. The

Vietnam Memorial. May 1993.

This is good information about the facts vs. fiction of the Vietnam War. Some of the information could be considered skewed based on whose opinion of the war is being discussed.

O’Nan, Stewart, ed. The Vietnam Reader. New York: Anchor Books Doubleday, 1998.

This is a compilation of music, books, movies and other major works during the Vietnam War. It is an excellent source of primary documents. I used the lyrics to protest songs from this book.

Small, Melvin. Covering Dissent: The Media and The Anti Vietnam War Movement. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1994.

Part of my unit will rely on the aspect of media during the war and how it was the first televised war and how that effected the war effort at home

Small, Melvin and William D. Hoover, eds. Give Peace a Chance: Exploring the Vietnam Antiwar Movement. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1992.

This book provides a good overview of the anti-war movement from the beginning to the end of the Vietnam War.

United States. Natl. Archives. Combat Area Casualty File. Washington, D.C.:

Center for Electronic Records, 1993.

This is good information about the facts vs. fiction of the Vietnam War. It is mostly statistical information that I have used.

Vietnam: A Television History. 1983. Videocassette. WGBH Boston and The

American Experience.

This video series is amazing.  Information on the Vietnam War is

presented in a very matter of fact and chronological way.  It has amazing

video footage from newscasters in Vietnam and the United States as well

as still photos.  There are many volumes to the series in one hour segments,

so it is easy to determine what part of the war you would want to zoom in on

if you would like to show segments of the war to students.

Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War. Narr. Richard Basehart. 1985.

Videocassette. Embassy Home Entertainment.

This is an interesting video series that interviews many participants

of the war.  One of the tapes that I watched in this series interviewed General

Westmoreland, and it was very interesting to hear him explain issues as he

saw it and hear him repeat and justify the calling of more American troops to

Vietnam.

Westmoreland, General William C. Third Annual Reunion of the Vietnam 

Helicopter Pilots Association.  Washington, DC Hilton Hotel. 5 July 1986.

This is good information about the facts vs. fiction of the Vietnam War; however, Westmoreland’s credibility is questionable. It is believed that he exaggerated many of the body counts so as to persuade Johnson into sending more men. It is also believed that he wrongly led Johnson to think that the fighting in Vietnam was “winnable.”

 www.washoe.k12.nv.us/americanhistory/secondary/lessons/lessons_std09/klaich_k.doc

 

Vietnam & Trotskyism

Section 2

The Vietnamese Trotskyists

By Andy Blunden
All the revolutionaries who introduced Communism to Vietnam and prepared the basis for the August 1945 Revolution came from the same generation, born in the first decade of the century, who participated as teenagers in the upsurge of nationalist activity in the mid-I920s, left their homeland in search of the theory necessary for liberation, returning in the late 20s and early 30s.
Those from the South (Nam Bo, Nam Ky region or Cochin-China) mostly went to France as students where they came in contact with the political struggles of the European working class. They joined either the Stalinist PCF or the International Left Opposition, whose criticism of the Comintern’s disastrous policies in China won much support among young Asian revolutionaries.
Among this group was Ta Thu Thau.
Ta Thu Thau was born on 5th May 1906 in Tan Binh, Long Xuyen province to a poor but educated family. He studied in Vietnam, gaining his baccalauréat in June 1925.
In 1926 he organised together with Tran Huy Lieu and Bui Cong Trung, demonstrations in support of Vietnamese nationalist leaders of the older generation (demanding amnesty for Phan Boi Chau and a state funeral for Phan Chu Trinh). This vast movement was successful, but the older nationalist leaders, to whose support the young revolutionaries had rallied, never again played any role in the national liberation struggle.
Ta Thu Thau helped found Dang Thanh Nien (Youth Party).
In September 1927 he left for France where he studied in the Faculty of Science, at the University of Paris. He never obtained a degree, becoming active in politics. Thau edited the student newspaper, Vanguard, and joined the Annamite Independence Party.
The Vietnamese Independence Party (PAI or Parti Annamite d’Independence ) recruited many Vietnamese students in France. It was founded 1926 by Nguyen The Truyen, a CC member of the PCF, who left the Stalinists and returned to nationalism. The ideological struggles of the European working class soon penetrated the PAI, and in 1929 the PAI disintegrated, the greater parts joining either the Stalinist or Trotskyist organisation.
Ta Thu Thau organised a Trotskyist group inside the PAI along with Huynh Van Phuong and Nguyen Van Luan.
Huynh Van Phuong was born on 30 May 1906 in My Tho province to a well to do family. He studied law at University of Paris and joined the ILO while a member of the PAI.
Following the brutal repression of the mutiny by Vietnamese soldiers at Yen Bay in the north of Vietnam (Bac Ky) in February 1930, the Vietnamese students in France organised powerful anti-colonialist demonstrations which received support from large sections of the French people. The right-wing French government cracked down on the young Vietnamese revolutionaries who organised the demonstrations and 19 were forcibly repatriated. Among the 19, were the Trotskyists Ta Thu Thau, Huynh Van Phuong and Phan Van Chanh, as well as Tran Van Thach and six leading Stalinists. It was these comrades who formed the first nucleus of the Left Opposition in Indochina, and lead the nationalist struggle in the south of Vietnam until 1945.
Ho Chi Minh (Nguyen Ai Quoc) had also learnt Marxism in France. As a young teacher he had travelled to France in December 1911, and in December 1920 voted with the majority of the French Socialist Party to join the Third International. Ho Chi Minh returned in 1924 and set up Thanh Nien (Youth), leading it from its Headquarters in Canton until the end of 1927, working closely with both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Ho Chi Minh had been arrested in Hong Kong on 5 June 1931, and was presumed to be dead. A funeral was even held. In fact, after his release Ho Chi Minh was recalled to Moscow, where he was forcibly confined, doing routine duties for the Comintern.
Ho Chi Minh had been blamed for the disastrous results of the Comintern’s ultra-left policies, which he had implemented in Vietnam. An ill-organised and premature insurrection had been brutally crushed by the French and the majority of ICP cadre killed or imprisoned. Ho Chi Minh was absent from the political scene throughout the 1930s, and, under Com intern leadership, the ICP was virtually eclipsed. Ho Chi Minh was hardly mentioned, except for some criticism in 1934, until his return to Vietnam in February 1941.
Returning to Saigon Ta Thu Thau founded, in 1931, Indochinese Communism, as a section of the International Left Opposition, the first Trotskyist organisation in Vietnam. Along with Ta Thu Thau, the founders of Indochinese Communism included Huynh Van Phuong, Phan Van Chanh and Le Van Thu.
The Indochinese Communist Party was founded in 1929 when, under Comintern direction, three different factions of the disintegrated Thanh Nien united.
In this period, the International Left Opposition saw itself as a faction of the Comintern. It had a perspective of winning a majority of the Third International back to Marxism, and where national sections of the ILO predominated over the Stalinists they were to regard the Stalinists as a minority faction.
In line with this perspective, Indochinese Communism saw itself as a faction of the ICP, and had a perspective of refounding the smashed ICP as a section of the Comintern in which the Left Opposition would be the majority faction.
Their paper was Proletarian Torch. The issue of 28 August 1932 stated:
‘The Left Faction of the Indochinese Communist Party learned with much sorrow that comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc has passed away …
‘Comrade Quoc is dead, but the ICP lives. It will live on indefinitely. The Left Faction of the ICP will follow you, comrade Quoc. It will continue its task and make sure that the Indochinese Communist Party will be the deserving and only party of Indochinese proletarians.’
Indochinese Communism later split into three factions—Left Opposition, October Left Opposition and Indochinese Communism. Indochinese Communism, led by Ta Thu Thau, sought to utilise legal opportunities.
October Left Opposition remained solely a clandestine organisation, and with its paper October, was led by Ho Huu Tuong.
Ho Huu Tuong was born on 10 October 1910, the son of a poor peasant in Thuong Thanh, Can Tho province. He was expelled from primary school in 1926 for his activity in the nationalist upsurge of the mid-1920s. He then studied in Aix-en-Provence and Lyons where he was active in politics and became a Trotskyist. He returned to Saigon in January 1931 and founded the October group, which later became known as the Ligue Communiste Internationaliste.
In the mid 1930s, Ho Huu Tuong met Dao Van Long, a former member of the Thanh Nien (Youth Party) of Ho Chi Minh, who had established in January 1931 the Vung Hong (Aurora) group, or Communist League, having about 50 members in the south. The Aurora group was critical of the Stalinists’ failure to turn to the working class, and Ho Huu Tuong won them to Trotskyism.
In 1932 Ta Thu Thau and over 120 other revolutionaries, both Stalinists and Trotskyists were arrested by the colonial government. The Trotskyists were to be tried in Saigon on May Day 1933, the Stalinists on the 2-6 May.
Elections to the Saigon Municipal Council were due for the 30 April. Six of the eighteen seats were reserved for Vietnamese, twelve for French. The Vietnamese seats had hitherto been monopolised by the Constitutionalists, a right-wing land-owners’ party.
In order to seize the opportunity created by the election campaign in order to popularise the ideas of Marxism and the militant national liberation struggle, and, in particular under conditions of severe repression, to defend their imprisoned comrades, the Struggle Front was initiated in January 1933 by members of the same 19 young revolutionaries who had been deported from France in May 1930.
The Front was formed by two Stalinists (Nguyen Van Tao [20.5.1906-1972, Minister for Labour in government of the DRVN] and Duong Bach Mai [born I7.4.1904, was head of the GPU in the South in August 1945 and principal assassin of the Trotskyists), two Trotskyists (Ta Thu Thau and Phan Van Hum), an anarchist (Trinh Hung Ngau) and two other left anti-colonialists (Nguyen An Ninh & Tran Van Thach). The Front had no name, but became known as the Struggle group—La Lutte—after its paper.
Phan Van Hum was born on 9 April 1902 in An Thanh, Thu Dau Mol province to a well to do family. As an official in the colonial administration in Hue, he sheltered striking students in 1927, became active in the anti-colonialist movement and was forced to resign. He returned to Saigon in 1928, and collaborated with Nguyen An Ninh in founding the High Aspirations Youth Party. He left for France 1929, studied at the Sorbonne where he came in contact with Marxism, became politically active and fled from the police, returning to Saigon and becoming one of the main leaders of La Lutte.
Tran Van Thach was born on 15 October 1903 to a wealthy family. He went to France in 1926, studied philosophy, gaining a degree from University of Paris. Returning to Saigon at the beginning of 1930, he was recruited to Trotskyism as a member of La Lutte in 1937. A teacher, he became a leading member of La Lutte.
The Stalinist members of the Front were not in close touch with the Comintern. The issue of their participation in La Lutte was not even raised at the July 1936 ICP Congress, and this was doubtless taken as tacit approval. The CC of the French PCF did give its approval to participation in the Front.
The formal objective of La Lutte was to use all possible legal means to struggle overtly for the ‘independent and historical interests of the working class and the oppressed masses and to make the general masses devote themselves to class struggle.’
The terms of the Front were that participating groups would agree to a) No calumny against USSR b) No hostile attitude towards Communist parties c) No press campaigns of a character contrary to the program of common action nor criticism against policy of the allied factions
The Front held public forums, and took over rallies called by their opponents. They made a big impact among the masses.
The paper was published for only two weeks before the election. It attacked the Constitutionalists, made popular Marxist propaganda in favour of democratic rights, the right to strike, free public housing etc, but closed down after only four issues due to lack of funds. It was not anticipated that the Front would continue after the elections.
After the election both the workers’ slate candidates elected were disqualified on technical grounds—Tran Van Thach hadn’t paid sufficient tax to qualify.
So successful was the Struggle Front [La Lutte], however, that it was continued. The rapid expansion of Communist influence in south of Vietnam in the 1930s was solely due to the activity of La Lutte, not the ICP of Ho Chi Minh.
Ta Thu Thau was liberated early in 1933, and became editor of La Lutte. From October 1934 La Lutte appeared as a regular weekly, every Thursday. In order to spread the influence of the new Front, Ta Thu Thau and Nguyen Van Tao travelled to the North and campaigned together.
By the time of the May 1935 elections, La Lutte and its leaders were well known and respected among the masses for their integrity. The anti-colonial struggle had been popularised among the masses in a way never seen before. Previously the anti-colonial struggle had been confined to a minority who worked clandestinely, now it had taken root among the masses.
In May 1935 two Trotskyists and two Stalinists were elected (Tao, Mai, Tran Van Thach and Ta Thu Thau) winning 4 of the 6 Vietnamese seats.
La Lutte acted as a contact point for all the anti-colonialist activists, especially those just released from prison, it held public meetings, recruited on the streets and everywhere in public.
In July 1935, the seventh World Congress of Comintern initiated the Popular Front policy. A Popular Front government was elected in France.
The promises of the Popular Front government raised the expectations of the Vietnamese, and undermined the confidence of colons.
These expectations were entirely disappointed, although there was, as a result largely of the expectations, a huge upsurge in the mass movement. Legal activity was possible for a period, and some political prisoners were released for a while. The October group continued to operate clandestinely as did the ICP.
La Lutte responded to the mass upsurge by turning to the masses in a broad campaign for democratic rights, and workers power. On 6 Oct 1938 a Vietnamese version of La Lutte, Tranh Dau, came out. In all there were five newspapers, including those of the clandestine organisations, but it was under the leadership of La Lutte that all the groups co-ordinated their anti-colonialist struggle.
The influence of the ICP had been reduced to nil by the early 1930s due to ultra-left policies of Comintern foisted upon the ICP, together with arrest of almost the entire cadre, in turn facilitated by adventurist tactics flowing from the Comintern line.
Cadre selected and trained by the Comintern during the period of ‘proletarianisation’, principally from among Vietnamese workers in France, chiefly domestic servants and cooks etc, and sent back by Comintern were usually of no use to the revolution. Most betrayed the cause as soon as they arrived or were arrested. Those who remained to lead the ICP were sycophants who blindly applied the Comintern line.
The Comintern ‘reconstructed’ the ICP in 1932, entirely separately from the small cadre that had survived the French repression. Despite this, the ICP benefitted from its membership of the Comintern in numerous ways; leaders were kept in ‘sanctuaries’ outside the country to escape repression, and to be returned later, replenishing the party’s forces; the solidarity actions of other sections; legal defence support etc, which the ILO could not give.
During the early 1930s the Comintern condemned any concession to ‘nationalism’, a policy which was disastrous in Vietnam.
It was those among the 19 students deported from France in May 1930, both Stalinists and Trotskyists, who led La Lutte which created the mass movement which was to be the basis of the August 1945 revolution, not members of the party founded by Ho Chi Minh, although the members of La Lutte saw themselves as part of the ICP.
The ICP was directed by the Comintern to break from La Lutte. It attempted to set up a Popular Front with bourgeois parties and individuals—the Indochinese Democratic Front. This was largely unsuccessful, except for election of Democratic Front representatives to Hanoi council in April 1939. Some members of the ICP went to the right in over-enthusiasm in implementing Popular Front line. Some refused to implement the line, especially in the south where La Lutte had been operating.
In December 1936 the Southern ICP, under the leadership of Nguyen Van Tao, voted to reject the ICP CC instruction to leave La Lutte.
In June 1936 La Lutte organised Marxist study groups among students and workers (arsenal and tramway workers). The study groups were banned in 1937.
On 13 August 1936 La Lutte initiated the Indochinese Congress, ostensibly to prepare submissions to France’s Popular Front government’s investigation commission. The Congress included representatives of bourgeois parties—in fact Nguyen Phan Long, head of Constitutionalists was elected chair.
The Indochinese Congress’s members included Nguyen Phan Long, Le Quang Liem (Constitutionalists), Nguyen Van Sam, Tran Van Kha (Left Constitutionalists), Nguyen Van Tao (Stalinist), Ta Thu Thau, Tran Van Thach, Ho Huu Tuong, Dao Van Long (Trotskyists), Nguyen An Ninh, Trinh Hung Ngau (an anarchist), Nguyen Thi Luu, Mai Huynh Hoa, Nguyen Thi Nam (women revolutionaries). The Constitutionalists resigned on 15 September 1936, but the Congress was always dominated by the members of La Lutte.
The actual activity of the Congress in fact went far beyond its ostensible role. It organised the masses into permanent Action Committees in villages, districts, cities, factories and professions, to formulate demands and perspectives for the struggle for an independent Vietnam.
600 Action Committees were formed in the south in one month, holding often daily meetings, bringing together 10,000 people, and distributing leaflets in numbers up to 450,000. Its activities affected all social classes. It also organised strikes, and by the end of 1936 achieved widespread popular action.
In 1937, the French Popular Front government banned the Indochinese Congress, and jailed Nguyen Van Tao, Ta Thu Thau and Nguyen An Ninh, the leaders of La Lutte.
While they were in jail, Ho Huu Tuong of the October group, later to become the Ligue Communiste Internationaliste, took over editorial leadership of La Lutte, and from early October to late November 1936 Struggle continued its attack on the Popular Front government of France, and also stepped up criticism of Stalin.
By June 1937, the Stalinists were compelled by the ICP to leave the front. Nevertheless, the southern region of the ICP still insisted on its independence within the ICP, and its right to oppose the Popular Front policy.
The legal conditions of the Popular Front had reduced the pressure which had made the La Lutte front possible and necessary, and the front broke up. The Stalinists increasingly resorted to the tactic of accusing the Trotskyists of being agents provocateurs, fascist agents etc.
The October group, led by Ho Huu Tuong, was strongest in Saigon-Cholon and had numerous members in many factories, especially the arsenal, the railway and the tramworks. At the arsenal they had several hundred members as against the Stalinists who had about 100.
During the period of 1931-36, they printed October (Thang Muoi), then, Le Militant. In 1938 they published the weekly Workers-Peasant Unity and Proletarian Revolution. In 1939 they produced the legal daily Tia Sang (Spark).
The October group remained entirely a clandestine organisation. It consistently refused to participate in joint fronts with the Stalinists, and maintained an unrelenting bitter polemic against the Stalinists.
(Ho Huu Tuong survived the repression following the August 1945 revolution, but apparently rejected Marxism in 1949 on ‘philosophical grounds’, returning to ‘literary work’. In 1977 he was arrested in Ho Chi Minh City leading a demonstration. Later released from prison, he died in 1980.)
From late 1938, due to the intensified repression of the colonial government, the ICP withdrew to the countryside and went underground. The ICP also began to take up the national question.
After the fall of the Popular Front government in France, on 26 September 1939, the PCF was ‘dissolved’. On 28 September 1939, the governor of Indochina ‘dissolved’ the ICP. Virtually all oppositionists were arrested by the colonialists in the first wave of arrests in September 1939—800 were arrested in the south, 2000 throughout the rest of the country. The organisations of both Trotskyists and Stalinists were decimated in this and subsequent raids.
France was defeated by fascist Germany in June 1940. The colonial regime supported Vichy France, and actively backed the Japanese even before the invasion of Indochina began. GauIlists were arrested.
The Japanese invasion began in September 1940, and was complete by July 1941. The Japanese made few changes in the administration of Vietnam—the French were left to run the colonial administration, and French troops given freedom of movement, but increasingly the French were seen as a mere ‘shell’ controlled by the Japanese.
Nationalist feelings grew dramatically as a result of the obvious weakness of the French colonialists. A badly organised insurrection in November-December 1940 in the south led to the decimation of the remaining cadre of the ICP.
Both the Japanese and French tried to appeal to Vietnamese nationalism, the Japanese encouraging religious groups Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, the French organising urban youth in sports clubs, scouts etc, which were in fact taken over by Communists.
The 8th Plenum of the ICP held in May 1941, in a mountainous region near the Chinese border, was chaired by Ho Chi Minh. He was now the only representative in the ICP leadership of older generation that had been active in 1920s. All the sycophants promoted into leadership by the Comintern were dead or imprisoned.
From November 1939, the Indochinese Democratic Front had been replaced by the National United Front, which aimed to unite all social classes on the basis of the anti-imperialist struggle. The Vietminh was founded, identifying the main enemy as the Japanese. The Vietminh sought and received assistance from the US, who indicated initially that they would support a Vietminh independent government. (Under Truman this was reversed and the US supported the French to re-establish colonial rule.) The Vietminh also sought to collaborate with Gaullist French.
On 22 December 1944 the Vietnamese People’s Army was established in zones liberated by the Vietminh near the Chinese border.
The French colonial power was destroyed by a Japanese coup d’état on 9 March 1945. The Japanese attacked all French positions at 9pm, and the French were destroyed within 24 hours.
Many of the anti-colonialist leaders escaped from prison in the confusion of the days after the coup. On 11 September, Emperor Bao Dai declared the ‘independence’ of Vietnam and the monarchs of Laos and Cambodia followed suit. There was however no response among the Vietnamese people to the Emperor’s pledge to collaborate with the Japanese and instead there was a flowering of political organisations, all aspiring to real independence.
After the Japanese coup d’état Japanese replaced French at the top, but otherwise the colonial administration continued much as before.
From late 1943 starvation had begun to spread, especially in the north, due to the accumulated pillage of the French colonialists and Japanese military occupation. The ICP put forward a policy of seizing granaries, which met a response among the peasants.
The liberated areas held by the ICP near the Chinese border, with Allied assistance, received a steady stream of workers and youth from the urban areas, and by the time of the fall of the Japanese a small but important base had been established by Ho Chi Minh’s Vietminh.

The events following the defeat of Japan are covered in the articles reprinted from Workers Press and will not be repeated here.

Ta Thu Thau, soon after his release after two years in prison, was imprisoned by the French at the Poulo Condor concentration camp from October 1939 until the fall of the Japanese in 1945. He emerged from prison half-paralysed due to maltreatment. He travelled to Hanoi to help co-ordinate famine relief but was arrested by the Vietminh while returning south, and murdered at Quang Ngai in September 1945.
Phan Van Chanh was killed by the Vietminh in October 1945 after being arrested along with other leaders of the Struggle group while holding a meeting in Xuan Truong.
Huynh Van Phuong had moved to Hanoi in 1936 where he had founded the Le Travail group with Vo Nguyen Giap, Tran Huy Lieu, Khuat Duy Tien and others. He was murdered by the Vietminh 1945.
Tran Van Thach, one of the principal leaders of the Trotskyists in the south, was arrested by the Vietminh after the Saigon insurrection of 23 September, while attending a meeting of La Lutte leadership at Xuan Truong and shot along with Nguyen Van So and Nguyen Van Tien, and other leaders of La Lutte, on 5 October 1945.
Phan Van Hum was killed by the Vietminh in October 1945 along with most of the remaining leaders of La Lutte.
Huynh Van Phuong was killed by the Vietminh in October 1945.
Ho Vinh Ky, a woman doctor, was shot by the Vietminh along with leaders of La Lutte in September 1945. Another Trotskyist, Nguyen Thi Toi was kiIIed by the Viet Minh in October 1945 in Can Giuoc.
Hinh Thai Thong of La Lutte was arrested while presiding at an inter-communal delegates meeting, and disembowelled by a Vietminh gang at My Tho in October 1945.
Tran Dinh Minh a young leader of the tramworkers and the LCI, a former writer from Hanoi, was killed by French troops at Plaine des Joncs 13 January 1946 following the death of 20 other tramworkers, who fought the Allied invasion which was supported by Vietminh colIaboration.
Le Van Vung, general secretary of the Saigon-Cholon regional council was assassinated by the French on 16 September 1945, thanks to Vietminh collaboration with the French.
Le Ngoc, a tram worker, and a CC member of the LCI was stabbed to death by the Vietminh in January 1946.
Nguyen Van Ky, an ICL labour leader, was murdered by the Vietminh in January 1946.
Nguyen Huong, a 14 year old tram worker and leader of the 60-strong workers’ militia at Go Vap tramworks was killed by Stalinist police in July 1946.
210 Trotskyists were killed at Thi Nghe in September 1945 by the British.
An unknown number of Trotskyists were killed after mass arrests by the Vietminh at My Tho, Tan An, Bien Hoa, Can Tho, Tay Ninh, in October 1945.
An unknown number of members of Trotskyist LCI were killed at Kien An by the Vietminh on 23 October 1945.
An unknown number of Trotskyist members of La Lutte group were arrested while holding meeting at Thu Duc, in October 1945, and killed at Ben Sue.
Most of the leaders of the Ligue Communiste Internationaliste were killed by the Vietminh on 14th September 1945 after the Vietminh surrounded the Headquarters of the Popular Committees and arrested all the delegates, who did not resist arrest.
Three quarters of membership of Vietnamese section of FI in exile, (Groupe Communiste Internationaliste du Vietnam) in France, ‘disappeared’ after being deported back to Vietnam in 1950-51.

17 June 1987

 http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/document/vietnam/pirani/ch02.htm

Andy Blunden June 1987

The Vietnamese Trotskyists.

All the revolutionaries who introduced Communism to Vietnam and prepared the basis for the August 1945 Revolution came from the same generation, born in the first decade of the century, who participated as teenagers in the upsurge of nationalist activity in the mid – 1920s, left their homeland in search of the theory necessary for liberation, returning in the late 20s and early 30s.
Those from the South (Nam Bo, Nam Ky region or Cochin – China) mostly went to France as students where they came in contact with the political struggles of the European working class. They joined either the Stalinist PCF or the International Left Opposition, whose criticism of the Comintern’s disastrous policies in China won much support among young Asian revolutionaries.
Among this group was Ta Thu Thau.
Ta Thu Thau was born on 5th May 1906 in Tan Binh Long Xuyen province to a poor but educated family. He studied in Vietnam, gaining his baccalauréat in June 1925.
In 1926 he organised together with Tran Huy Lieu and Bui Cong Trung, demonstrations in support of Vietnamese nationalist leaders of the older generation (demanding amnesty for Phan Boi Chau and a state funeral for Phan Chu Trinh). Ibis vast movement was successful, but the older nationalist leaders, to whose support the young revolutionaries had rallied, never again played any role in the national liberation struggle.
Ta Thu Thau helped found Dang Thanh Nien (Youth Party).
In September 1927 he left for France where he studied in the Faculty of Science, at the University of Paris. He never obtained a degree, becoming active in politics. Thau edited the student newspaper, Vanguard, and joined the Annamite Independence Party.
The Vietnamese Independence Party (PAI) or Parti Annamite d'Independence) recruited many Vietnamese students in France. It was founded 1926 by Nguyen The Truyen, a CC member of the PCF, who left the Stalinists and returned to nationalism. The ideological struggles of the European working class soon penetrated the PAT, and in 1929 the PAT disintegrated, the greater parts joining either the Stalinist or Trotskyist organisation.
Ta Thu Thau organised a Trotskyist group inside the PAI along with Huynh Van Phuong and Nguyen Van Luan.
Huynh Van Phuong was born on 30 May 1906 in My Tho province to a well to do family. He studied law at University of Paris and joined the ILO while a member of the PAI.
Following the brutal repression of the mutiny by Vietnamese soldiers at Yen Bay in the north of Vietnam (Bac Ky) in February 1930, the Vietnamese students in France organised powerful anti – colonialist demonstrations which received support from large sections of the French people. The right – wing French government cracked down on the young Vietnamese revolutionaries who organised the demonstrations mid 19 were forcibly repatriated. Among the 19, were the Trotskyists Ta Thu Thau, Huynh Van Phuong and Phan Van Chanh, as well as Tran Van Thach and six leading Stalinists. It was these comrades who formed the first nucleus of the Left Opposition in Indochina, and lead the nationalist struggle in the south of Vietnam until 1945.
Ho Chi Minh (Nguyen Ai Quoc) had also learnt Marxism in France. As a young teacher he had travelled to France in December 1911, and in December 1920 voted with the majority of the French Socialist Party to join the Third International. Ho Chi Minh returned in 1924 and set up Thanh Nien (Youth), leading it from its Headquarters in Canton until the end of 1927, working closely with both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Ho Chi Minh had been arrested in Hong Kong on 5 June 193 1, and was presumed to be dead. A funeral was even held. hi fact, after his release Ho Chi Minh was recalled to Moscow, where he was forcibly confined, doing routine duties for the Comintern.
Ho Chi Minh had been blamed for the disastrous results of the Comintern’s ultra – left policies, which he had implemented in Vietnam. An ill – organised and premature insurrection had been brutally crushed by the French and the majority of ICP cadre killed or imprisoned. Ho Chi Minh was absent from the political scene throughout the 1930s, and, under Comintern leadership, the ICP was virtually eclipsed. Ho Chi Minh was hardly mentioned, except for some criticism in 1934, until his return to Vietnam in February 1941.
Returning to Saigon Ta Thu Thau founded, in 1931, Indochinese Communism, as a section of the International Left Opposition, the first Trotskyist organisation in Vietnam. Along with Ta Thu Thau, the founders of Indochinese Communism included Huynh Van Phuong, Phan Van Chanh and Le Van Thu.
The Indochinese Communist Party was founded in 1929 when, under Comintern direction, three different factions of the disintegrated Thanh Nien united.
In this period, the International Left Opposition saw itself as a faction of the Comintern. It had a perspective of winning a majority of the Third International back to Marxism, and where national sections of the ILO predominated over the Stalinists they were to regard the Stalinists as a minority faction.
In line with this perspective, Indochinese Communism saw itself as a faction of the ICP, and had a perspective of refounding the smashed ICP as a section of the Comintern in which the Left Opposition would be the majority faction.
Their paper was Proletarian Torch. The issue of 28 August 1932 stated:

The Left Faction of the Indochinese Communist Party learned with much sorrow that comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc has passed away...

‘Comrade Quoc is dead, but the ICP lives. It will live on indefinitely. The Left Faction of the ICP will follow you, comrade Quoc. It will continue its task and make sure that the Indochinese Communist Party will be the deserving and only party of Indochinese proletarians.’
Indochinese Communism later split into three factions – Left Opposition, October Left Opposition and Indochinese Communism. Indochinese Communism, led by Ta Thu Thau, sought to utilise legal opportunities.
October Left Opposition remained solely a clandestine organisation, and with its paper October, was led by Ho Huu Tuong.
Ho Huu Tuong was born on 10 October 1910, the son of a poor peasant in Thuong Thanh, Can Tho province. He was expelled from primary school in 1926 for his activity in the nationalist upsurge of the mid – 1920s. He then studied in Aix-en-Provence and Lyons where he was active in politics and became a Trotskyist. He returned to Saigon in January 1931 and founded the October group, which later became known as the Ligue Communiste Intemationaliste.
In the mid-1930s, Ho Huu Tuong met Dao Van Long. a former member of the Thanh Nien (Youth Party) of Ho Chi Minh, who had established in January 1931 the Vung Hong (Aurora) group, or Communist League, having about 50 members in the south. The Aurora group was critical of the Stalinists’ failure to turn to the working class, and Ho Huu Tuong won them to Trotskyism.
In 1932 Ta Thu Thau and over 120 other revolutionaries, both Stalinists and Trotskyists were arrested by the colonial government. The Trotskyists were to be tried in Saigon on May Day 1933, the Stalinists on the 2-6 May.
Elections to the Saigon Municipal Council were due for the 30 April. Six of the eighteen seats were reserved for Vietnamese, twelve for French. The Vietnamese seats had hitherto been monopolised by the Constitutionalists, a right-wing land – owners’ party.
In order to seize the opportunity created by the election campaign in order to popularise the ideas of Marxism and the militant national liberation struggle, and, in particular under conditions of severe repression, to defend their imprisoned comrades, the Struggle Front was initiated in January 1933 by members Of the same 19 young revolutionaries who had been deported from France in May 1930.
The Front was formed by two Stalinists (Nguyen Van Tao [20.5.1906 – 1972, Minister for Labour in government of the DRVN] and Duong Bach Mai [born 17.4.1904, was head of the GPU in the South in August 1945 and principal assassin of the Trotskyists), two Trotskyists (Ta Thu Thau and Phan Van Hum), an anarchist (Trinh Hung Ngau) and two other left anti – colonialists (Nguyen An Ninh & Tran Van Thach). The Front had no name, but became known as the Struggle group – La Lutte – after its paper.
Phan Van Hum was born on 9 April 1902 in An Thanh, Thu Dau Mot province to a well to do family. As an official in the colonial administration in Hue, he sheltered striking students in 1927, became active in the anti – colonialist movement and was forced to resign. He returned to Saigon in 1928, and collaborated with Nguyen An Ninh in founding the High Aspirations Youth Party. He left for France 1929, studied at the Sorbonne where he came in contact with Marxism, became politically active and fled from the police, returning to Saigon and becoming one of the main leaders of La Lutte.
Tran Van Thach was born on 15 October 1903 to a wealthy family. He went to France in 1926, studied philosophy, gaining a degree from University of Paris. Returning to Saigon at the beginning of 1930, he was recruited to Trotskyism as a member of La Lutte in 1937. A teacher, he became a leading member of La Lutte.
The Stalinist members of the Front were not in close touch with the Comintern. The issue of their participation in La Lutte was not even raised at the July 1936 ICP Congress, and this was doubtless taken as tacit approval. The CC of the French PCF did give its approval to participation in the Front.
The formal objective of La Lutte was to use all possible legal means to struggle overtly for the ‘independent and historical interests of the working class and the oppressed masses and to make the general masses devote themselves to class struggle.’
The terms of the Front were that participating groups would agree to

‘a) No calumny against USSR
b) No hostile attitude towards Communist parties
c) No press campaigns of a character contrary to the program of common action nor criticism against policy of the allied factions’

The Front held public forums, and took over rallies called by their opponents. They made a big impact among the masses.
The paper was published for only two weeks before the election. It attacked the Constitutionalists, made popular Marxist propaganda in favour of democratic rights, the right to strike, free public housing etc., but closed down after only four issues due to lack of funds. It was not anticipated that the Front would continue after the elections.
After the election both the workers’ slate candidates elected were disqualified on technical grounds – Tran Van Thach hadn’t paid sufficient tax to qualify.
So successful was the Struggle Front [La Lutte], however, that it was continued. The rapid expansion of Communist influence in south of Vietnam in the 1930s was solely due to the activity of La Lutte, not the ICP of Ho Chi Minh.
Ta Thu Tliau was liberated early in 1933, and became editor of La Lutte. From October 1934 La Lutte appeared as a regular weekly, every Thursday. In order to spread the influence of the new Front, Ta Thu Thau and Nguyen Van Tao travelled to the North and campaigned together.
By the time of the May 1935 elections, La Lutte and its leaders were well known and respected among the masses for their integrity. The and – colonial struggle had been popularised among the masses in a way never seen before. Previously the anti – colonial struggle had been confined to a minority who worked clandestinely, now it had taken root among the masses.
In May 1935 two Trotskyists and two Stalinists were elected (Tao, Mai, Tran Van Thach and Ta Thu Thau) winning 4 of the 6 Vietnamese seats.
La Lutte acted as a contact point for all the anti – colonialist activists, especially those just released from prison, it held public meetings, recruited on the streets and everywhere in public.
In July 1935, the seventh World Congress of Comintern initiated the Popular Front policy. A Popular Front government was elected in France.
The promises of the Popular Front government raised the expectations of the Vietnamese, and undermined the confidence of colons.
These expectations were entirely disappointed, a) though there was, as a result largely of the expectations, a huge upsurge in the mass movement. Legal activity was possible for a period, and some political prisoners were released for a while. The October group continued to operate clandestinely as did the IVP.
La Lutte responded to the mass upsurge by turning to the masses in a broad campaign for democratic rights, and workers power. On 6 Oct 1938 a Vietnamese version of La Lutte, Tranh Dau, came out. In all there were five newspapers, including those of the clandestine organisations, but it was under the leadership of La Lutte that all the groups co – ordinated their anti – colonialist struggle.
The influence of the ICP had been reduced to nil by the early 1930s due to ultra – left policies of Comintern foisted upon the ICP, together with arrest of almost the entire cadre, in turn facilitated by adventurist tactics flowing from the Comintern line.
Cadre selected and trained by the Comintern during the period of ‘proletarianisation’, principally from among Vietnamese workers in France, chiefly domestic servants and cooks etc, and sent back by Comintern were usually of no use to the revolution. Most betrayed the cause as soon as they arrived or were arrested. Those who remained to lead the ICP were sycophants who blindly applied the Comintern line.
The Comintern ‘reconstructed’ the ICP in 1932, entirely separately from the small cadre that had survived the French repression. Despite this, the ICP benefitted from its membership of the Comintern in numerous ways; leaders were kept in ‘sanctuaries’ outside the country to escape repression, and to be returned later, replenishing the party’s forces; the solidarity actions of other sections; legal defence support etc., which the ILO could not give.
During the early 1930s the Comintern condemned any concession to ‘nationalism’, a policy which was disastrous in Vietnam.
It was those among the 19 students deported from France in May 1930, both Stalinists and Trotskyists, who led La Lutte which created the mass movement which was to be the basis of the August 1945 revolution, not members of the party founded by Ho Chi Minh, although the members of La Lutte saw themselves as pan of the ICP.
The ICP was directed by the Comintern to break from La Lutte. It attempted to set up a Popular Front with bourgeois parties and individuals – the Indochinese Democratic Front. This was largely unsuccessful, except for election of Democratic Front representatives to Hanoi council in April 1939. Some members of the ICP went to the right in over – enthusiasm in implementing Popular Front line. Some refused to implement the line, especially in the south where La Lutte had been operating.
In December 1936 the Southern ICP, under the leadership of Nguyen Van Tao, voted to reject the ICP CC instruction to leave La Lutte.
In June 1936 La Lutte organised Marxist study groups among students and workers (arsenal and tramway workers). The study groups were banned in 1937.
On 13 August 1936 La Lutte initiated the Indochinese Congress, ostensibly to prepare submissions to France’s Popular Front governments investigation commission. The Congress included representatives of bourgeois parties – - in fact Nguyen Phan Long, head of Constitutionalists was elected chair. The Indochinese Congress’s members included Nguyen Phan Long, Le Quang Liem (Constitutionalists), Nguyen Van Sam, Tran Van Kha (Left Constitutionalists), Nguyen Van Tao (Stalinist), Ta Thu Thau, Tran Van Thach, Ho Huu Tuong, Dao Van Long (Trotskyists), Nguyen An Ninh, Trinh Hung Ngau (an anarchist), Nguyen Thi Luu, Mai Huynh Hoa, Nguyen Thi Nam (women revolutionaries). The Constitutionalists resigned on 15 September 1936, but the Congress was always dominated by the members of La Lutte.
The actual activity of the Congress in fact went far beyond its ostensible role. It organised the masses into permanent Action Committees in villages, districts, cities, factories and professions, to formulate demands and perspectives for the struggle for an independent Vietnam.
600 Action Committees were formed in the south in one month, holding often daily meetings, bringing together 10,000 people, and distributing leaflets in numbers up to 450,000. Its activities affected all social classes. It also organised strikes, and by the end of 1936 achieved widespread popular action.
In 1937, the French Popular Front government banned the Indochinese Congress, and jailed Nguyen Van Tao, Ta Thu Thau and Nguyen An Ninh, the leaders of La Lutte.
While they were in jail, Ho Huu Tuong of the October group, later to become the Ligue Communiste Internationaliste took over editorial leadership of La Lutte, and from early October to late November 1936 Struggle continued its attack on the Popular Front government of France, and also stepped up criticism of Stalin.
By June 1937, the Stalinists were compelled by the ICP to leave the front. Nevertheless, the southern region of the ICP still insisted on its independence within the ICP, and its right to oppose the Popular Front policy.
The legal conditions of the Popular Front had reduced the pressure which had made the La Lutte front possible and necessary, and the front broke up. The Stalinists increasingly resorted to the tactic of accusing the Trotskyists of being agents provocateurs, fascist agents etc.
The October group, led by Ho Huu Tuong, was strongest in Saigon – Cholon and had numerous members in many factories, especially the arsenal, the railway and the tramworks. At the arsenal they had several hundred members as against the Stalinists who had about 100.
During the period of 1931 – 36, they printed October (Thang Muoi) , then, Le Militant. In 1938 they published the weekly Workers – Peasant Unity and Proletarian Revolution. In 1939 they produced the legal daily Tia Sang (Spark).
The October group remained entirely a clandestine organisation. It consistently refused to participate in joint fronts with the Stalinists, and maintained an unrelenting bitter polemic against the Stalinists.
(Ho Huu Tuong survived the repression following the August 1945 revolution, but apparently rejected Marxism in 1949 on ‘philosophical grounds’, returning to ‘literary work’. In 1977 he was arrested in Ho Chi Minh City leading a demonstration. Later released from prison, he died in 1980.)
From late 1938, due to the intensified repression of the colonial government, the ICP withdrew to the countryside and went underground. The ICP also began to take up the national question.
After the fall of the Popular Front government in France, on 26 September 1939, the PCF was ‘dissolved’. On 28 September 1939, the governor of Indochina ‘dissolved’ the ICP. Virtually all oppositionists were arrested by the colonialists in the first wave of arrests in September 1939 – 800 were arrested in the south, 2000 throughout the rest of the country. The organisations of both Trotskyists and Stalinists were decimated in this and subsequent raids.
France was defeated by fascist Germany in June 1940. The colonial regime supported Vichy France, and actively backed the Japanese even before the invasion of Indochina began. Gaullists were arrested.
The Japanese invasion began in September 1940, and was complete by July 1941. The Japanese made few changes in the administration of Vietnam – the French were left to run the colonial administration, and French troops given freedom of movement, but increasingly the French were seen as a mere ‘shell’ controlled by the Japanese.
Nationalist feelings grew dramatically as a result of the obvious weakness of the French colonialists. A badly organised insurrection in November – December 1940 in the south led to the decimation of the remaining cadre of the ICP.
Both the Japanese and French tried to appeal to Vietnamese nationalism, the Japanese encouraging religious groups Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, the French organising urban youth in sports clubs, scouts etc., which were in fact taken over by Communists.
The 8th Plenum of the ICP held in May 1941, in a mountainous region near the Chinese border, was chaired by Ho Chi Minh. He was now the only representative in the ICP leadership of older generation that had been active in 1920s All the sycophants promoted into leadership by the Comintern were dead or imprisoned.
From November 1939, the Indochinese Democratic Front had been replaced by the National United Front, which aimed to unite all social classes on the basis of the anti – imperialist struggle. The Vietminh was founded, identifying the main enemy as the Japanese. The Vietminh sought and received assistance from the US, who indicated initially that they would support a Vietminh independent government. (Under Truman this was reversed and the US supported the French to re – establish colonial rule.) The Vietminh also sought to collaborate with Gaullist French.
On 22 December 1944 the Vietnamese People’s Army was established in zones liberated by the Vietminh near the Chinese border.
The French colonial power was destroyed by a Japanese coup d'état on 9 March 1945. The Japanese attacked all French positions at 9pm, and the French were destroyed within 24 hours.
Many of the anti-colonialist leaders escaped from prison in the confusion of the days after the coup. On 11 September, Emperor Bao Dai declared the ‘independence’ of Vietnam and the monarchs of Laos and Cambodia followed suit. There was however no response among the Vietnamese people to the Emperor’ s pledge to collaborate with the Japanese and instead there was a flowering of political organisations, all aspiring to real independence.
After the Japanese coup d'état Japanese replaced French at the top, but otherwise the colonial administration continued much as before.
From late 1943 starvation had begun to spread, especially in the north, due to the accumulated pillage of the French colonialists and Japanese military occupation. The ICP put forward a policy of seizing granaries, which met a response among the peasants.
The liberated areas held by the ICP near the Chinese border, with Allied assistance, received a steady stream of workers and youth from the urban areas, and by the time of the fall of the Japanese a small but important base had been established by Ho Chi Minh’s Vietminh.
The events following the defeat of Japan are covered in the articles reprinted from Workers Press and will not be repeated here.
Ta Thu Thau, soon after his release after two years in prison, was imprisoned by the French at the Poulo Condor concentration camp from October 1939 until the fall of the Japanese in 1945. He emerged from prison half – paralysed due to maltreatment. He travelled to Hanoi to help co – ordinate famine relief but was arrested by the Vietminh while returning south, and murdered at Quang Ngai in September 1945.
Phan Van Chanh was killed by the Vietminh in October 1945 after being arrested along with other leaders of the Struggle group while holding a meeting in Xuan Truong.
Huynh Van Phuong had moved to Hanoi in 1936 where he had founded the Le Travail group with Vo Nguyen Giap, Tran Huy Lieu, Khuat Duy Tien and others. He was murdered by the Vietminh 1945.
Tran Van Thach, one of the principal leaders of the Trotskyists in the south, was arrested by the Vietminh after the Saigon insurrection of 23 September, while attending a meeting of La Lutte leadership at Xuan Truong and shot along with Nguyen Van So and Nguyen Van Tien, and other leaders of La Lutte, on 5 October 1945.
Phan Van Hum was killed by the Vietminh in October 1945 along with most of the remaining leaders of La Lutte.
Huynh Van Phuong was killed by the Vietminh in October 1945.
Ho Vinh Ky, a woman doctor, was shot by the Vietminh along with leaders of La Lutte in September 1945. Another Trotskyist, Nguyen Thi Toi was killed by the Viet Minh in October 1945 in Can Giuoc.
Hinh Thai Thong of La Lutte was arrested while presiding at an inter – communal delegates meeting, and disembowelled by a Vietminh gang at My Tho in October 1945.
Tran Dinh Minh a young leader of the tramworkers and the LCI, a former writer from Hanoi, was killed by French troops at Plaine des Joncs 13 January 1946 following the death of 20 other tramworkers, who fought the Allied invasion which was supported by Vietminh collaboration.
Le Van Vung, general secretary of the Saigon-Cholon regional council was assassinated by the French on 16 September 1945, thanks to Vietminh collaboration with the French.
Le Ngoe, a tramworker, and a CC member of the LCI was stabbed to death by the Vietminh in January 1946.
Nguyen Van Ky, an ICL labour leader, was murdered by the Vietminh in January 1946.
Nguyen Huong, a 14 year old tramworker and leader of the 60 – strong workers’ militia at Go Vap tramworks was killed by Stalinist police in July 1946.
210 Trotskyists were killed at Thi Nghe in September 1945 by the British.
An unknown number of Trotskyists were killed after mass arrests by the Vietminh at My Tho, Tan An, Bien Hoa, Can Tho, Tay Ninh in October 1945.
An unknown number of members of Trotskyist LCI were killed at Kien An by the Vietminh on 23 October 1945.
An unknown number of Trotskyist members of La Lutte group were arrested while holding meeting at Thu Duc, in October 1945, and killed at Ben Suc.
Most of the leaders of the Ligue Communiste Internationalism were killed by the Vietminh on 14th September 1945 after the Vietminh surrounded the Headquarters of the Popular Committees and arrested all the delegates, who did not resist arrest.
Three quarters of membership of Vietnamese section of FI in exile, (Groupe Communiste Internationaliste du Vietnam) in France, ‘disappeared’ after being deported back to Vietnam in 1950-51.

17.6.1987

http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/vietnamese-trotskyists.htm